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*  Monetary policy must reinvent itself in the wake 
of the crisis. Reinvention is particularly important 
because the system is riddled with uncertainties 
and the scope for applying both conventional 
and unconventional instruments is limited. The 
architecture of Economic and Monetary Union 
makes the challenge even greater because 
alignment of preferences and policies can only 
go so far. The European Central Bank will have 
to be clearer on what it can do, while remaining 
flexible in order to manage current uncertainties 
and unknowns. While the ECB’s main objective 
is price stability, it will also have to contribute to 
the identification of, and response to, financial 
imbalances, while preserving its independence.
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1. STATE OF AFFAIRS
You take over responsibility for price stability in the euro area 
at a time of a slowing but continuing recovery1. Unemployment 
has fallen rapidly since 2015, and deflation fears have receded as 
headline inflation has slowly increased. However, core inflation 
has persisted at around 1 percent for the last four to five years, 
inflation expectations have renewed their downward trend and 
wages still only partially reflect better employment conditions. 
Meanwhile, digitalisation and global geopolitical risks add to the 
unknown. Markets have little faith that the European Central Bank 
will manage to bring inflation back to its close to 2 percent target 
in the next five to 10 years (Figure 1), believing instead that this 
can be achieved only in the very long run. How can you, as the new 
ECB president, convince them otherwise?
You begin your term with the legacy of the Great Recession. 
The ECB was confronted with challenges: inflation volatility, risk 
of deflation visible in the downward trends in both actual and 
expected inflation, and a break in the transmission mechanism as 
a result of the banking crisis and the emergence of redenomina-
tion risk. While inflation might not be as volatile today, all other 
issues remain very relevant. 
In response to these challenges, the ECB reduced its interest 
rates sharply, even into negative territory, and committed, via for-
ward guidance, to staying there. However, constrained by the lower 
bound on interest rates and the resulting difficulty of lowering the 
whole yield curve, the ECB, like other advanced-economy central 
banks, resorted to balance-sheet management, culminating in 
Quantitative Easing (QE) – the purchasing of covered bonds, asset-
backed securities, public-sector bonds and corporate bonds.
In parallel, the ECB introduced tools to restore the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, first through the Securities Market 
Programme (SMP) in 2010 and, second – and more successfully 
– through the announcement and specification of the Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in 2012.
You therefore start your term with a big balance sheet, an interest 
rate with limited space for further downward movement and a system 
in need of reassurance that the OMT is ready to be used, if need be.
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Looking back at macroeconomic policies implemented in the 
course of the past 10 years, it is our view that the ECB played a 
disproportionate role in dealing with the euro crisis. As the ‘only 
game in town’, the ECB acted in ways that have arguably brought 
it to the limits of its competences. The borders between fiscal and 
monetary policy have been blurred, adding to the complexity 
deriving from the fact that the ECB operates in a monetary union 
of 19 fiscal preferences that are only partly aligned. At the same 
time, the persistence of low rates implies that their distributional 
consequences have become more visible, subjecting the ECB, its 
policies and even its independence to greater scrutiny. 
This picture has not really changed much and you could again 
 Figure 1: Euro-area inflation, core, actual and market expectations (year-on-year, %)
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg. Note: inflation expectations as of April 2019, derived from inflation zero-
coupon swaps of different terms (1 year, 2 years, up to 30 years), which provide information on market expectations 
of average yearly inflation over the contract term. Expectations for 2020 inflation, for instance, are derived from 
expected inflation over the next year (2019), given by the 1-year swap, and expected inflation over the next two years 
(2019 and 2020), given by the 2 year swap. Expectations are related to the Eurostat Harmonised Indices of Consumer 
Price (HICP) excluding tobacco.
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be confronted with fiscal ‘inaction’ in the next recession, in which 
case you would have to respond, again, with more force than what 
a fully coordinated fiscal-monetary action would dictate. Only 
this time, you would have limited room to manoeuvre with your 
current tools. You start therefore with an overextended monetary 
policy, in which you may need to do more to achieve less, com-
pared to your predecessors. 
2 CHALLENGES
You face three broad challenges.
You will continue to operate in an incomplete monetary 
union. The single currency is unique in terms of its govern-
ance and the tools available to manage it. This requires a degree 
of adaptability from the ECB that is not asked of other similar 
institutions. 
The first consequence of this incompleteness is that the coor-
dination of fiscal and monetary policy in normal times is at best 
imperfect, given that the former happens at national level and the 
latter at euro-area level. There is no tool to carry out countercycli-
cal fiscal policy at euro-area level in combination with monetary 
policy to manage the cycle. This has put the burden on monetary 
policy, a reality you also will probably be confronted with in the 
next recession. But this time the space to manoeuvre with the tools 
currently available will be considerably more limited. Reducing 
this risk requires you to play an active role in Eurogroup meetings. 
Your challenge will be to try to inform debates in order to help 
align national fiscal policies with one other and with monetary 
policy. Meanwhile, you must safeguard your independence from 
political pressure that would have you deviate from your mandate.
Timeliness of decision-making is equally important. The 
multi-country nature of monetary union implies that policies 
like QE might be delayed because they are politically difficult to 
implement. Indeed, the ECB started its programme six years after 
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. Your challenge will 
be to ensure timely responses to shocks. 
The euro crisis also revealed the vulnerability of the Economic 
and Monetary Union architecture and the crucial role the ECB 
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must play to deal with this. Given the prohibition of monetary 
financing, the issuance of debt to implement national fiscal policy 
comes under greater market scrutiny. We saw this during the crisis 
when some countries were cut out of the markets. But market scru-
tiny does not always differentiate between a shortage of liquidity 
and an unsustainable fiscal debt. Thus the provision of ample 
liquidity at early stages of stress, after a technical and political 
agreement that the debt is sustainable, is crucial to prevent liquid-
ity shortages threatening solvency for euro-area members.
Your predecessor’s 2012 “whatever it takes” promise, and its 
formalisation through OMT, has proved effective in dealing with 
this problem and became a pivotal piece of the euro architecture 
reform during the crisis. OMT has not had to be deployed so far. 
Nevertheless, should a euro-area country experience difficulties, 
the ECB must be prepared to apply it in full.
Last, the composition of the governing council and the ECB 
decision-making process are also direct reflections of the incom-
plete monetary union. Taking monetary policy decisions by 
unanimity, or at least by consensus, was deemed necessary at the 
start of the monetary union to ensure that the ECB speaks with one 
supra-national voice. But during the crisis, an increasing number 
of decisions were taken by majority (Claeys and Linta, 2019). It will 
be your challenge to contain disagreements so that they do not 
undermine your decisions. 
The second challenge you face is the significantly reduced 
scope to apply your tools. In terms of tightening policy rates, 
there is no constraint, but there is limited room to ease monetary 
policy further, given that nominal interest rates are at their lowest 
level for more than two centuries and probably ever (Papadia and 
Välimäki, 2018). In addition, interest rates are expected to stay at 
very low levels for the next three decades. Financial market partic-
ipants expect nominal short-term rates in the euro area to be still 
around 1 percent in 2049 (Figure 2). 
It is important to try and understand the economic and finan-
cial drivers behind this situation, whether it is a short-lived phe-
nomenon or whether this long-term picture is accurate. 
What this picture does however suggest is that the ECB will have 
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to rely more on balance-sheet management and less on inter-
est-rate changes to deal with the next recession. This poses two 
challenges: first, while QE has helped to reduce the risk of defla-
tion, asset purchases are more difficult to calibrate than rate cuts, 
and their macroeconomic effects are less clear. Second, when the 
ECB stopped its net purchases at the end of 2018, it had reached 
the 33 percent issuer limit for sovereign bonds for some jurisdic-
tions (Claeys et al, 2018), which it put in place when it started its 
sovereign asset purchase programme. The rationale for this limit 
was that the ECB did not wish to be in the position of having the 
power to block the restructuring of a euro-area country’s ECB-held 
debt, on the basis that not blocking such a restructuring might 
be interpreted as monetary financing. Combined with the rule 
* BALANCE-SHEET 
MANAGEMENT
Figure 2: Short-term interest rates and market expectations (%)
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg. Note: Interest rate expectations as of April 2019, derived from EONIA ze-
ro-coupon swaps of different terms (1 year, 2 years, up to 30 years), which provide information on market expecta-
tions of the compounded overnight EONIA over the contract term. Expectations for 2020 interest rate, for instance, 
are derived through expected compounded EONIA over the next year (2019), given by the 1 year swap, and expected 
compounded EONIA over the next two years (2019 and 2020), given by the 2 year swap.
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requiring purchases to be proportionate to the shares of differ-
ent national central banks in the ECB’s capital, this limit reduces 
drastically the scope of asset purchases.
At the same time, the economy continuing to operate with 
very low interest rates raises financial-stability concerns. 
Persistently low interest rates can lead financial institutions to 
search for yield by pursuing excessive risk taking (Dell’Ariccia et 
al, 2017). Though the problem of non-performing loans is being 
reduced, households and firms in the euro area already have 
high levels of indebtedness. Extra debt, encouraged by low inter-
est rates can increase the debt overhang and financial vulnera-
bilities, all other things being equal. There is the risk therefore 
that the ECB could be torn between wanting to raise rates for 
financial-stability reasons while needing to keep them low for 
price-stability purposes2. 
The obvious solution to this dilemma should come from 
macro-prudential measures, and indeed a number of euro-area 
countries have resorted to such measures to deal with local 
issues. There are doubts, however, whether macro-prudential 
tools can address financial instability effectively. First, there is 
a cumbersome division of responsibilities between national 
authorities, the ECB and the European Systemic Risk Board. 
Second, macro-prudential measures are intrinsically prone to 
regulatory arbitrage. Third, the analytic apparatus guiding the 
adoption and calibration of macroprudential measures is still 
under development.
*MACRO-
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The third challenge you will be confronted with is our lack 
of understanding of what a new ‘economic normal’ looks like. 
Some characterise this lack of knowledge of what the new steady 
state is, and therefore the lack of understanding of what the new 
equilibrium will be, as fundamental uncertainty. How can you 
decide on your policy response if you do not know where you are 
heading? It is in the nature of fundamental uncertainty that you 
cannot measure it. But in your internal deliberations, your staff 
will confront you with a number of arguments that will point in 
the direction that we are indeed operating in an environment of 
fundamental uncertainty.
First, while most economists argue that the neutral interest rate 
has decreased, econometric estimates of this rate are very poor 
(Beyer and Wieland, 2019). This implies that underlying models 
– our interpretation of how the economy works – are also poor3. 
In fact, Figures 1 and 2 considered together indicate the unusual 
result that markets believe that in the long run (ie in equilibrium), 
the real interest rate is negative (as expected inflation is 2 percent 
and the nominal interest rate is 1 percent by 2049). Here your chal-
lenge is to plan for contingencies: if the low market expectations 
shown in Figures 1 and 2 prove wrong and inflation and policy 
rates move back towards 2 percent and 4-5 percent respectively, 
monetary policy would again have space to manage both sides of 
the business cycle. In this scenario, the ECB will have to manage 
and communicate the means and timing of its exit from negative 
rates and, if necessary, of a gradual reduction in the Eurosystem 
balance sheet. 
However, if market expectations turn out to be correct and the 
neutral rate remains very low or even negative, as suggested by 
Holston et al (2017), the difficulty for the ECB will be of a different 
order of magnitude, as we discussed when we described the lim-
ited scope for using your tools.
Second, your staff will tell you that the link between employ-
ment and wage developments has weakened as the Phillips curve 
might have flattened (at least in some countries; see Bonam et 
al, 2018), while the relationship between wage and price devel-
opments has also become less certain. Critical variables, such 
*MARKET 
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as that for the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment, 
have become difficult to gauge. So it appears there is both less 
space for monetary policy and its effect might be smaller. Darvas 
(2019) showed that the ECB’s inflation projections in recent years 
have been systematically wrong. Such observations imply that 
we understand much less well the monetary-policy transmission 
channel. This could jeopardise monetary policy effectiveness and 
threaten the ECB’s credibility.
Last, broader developments render the shape and form of this 
new normal unknown. The digital transformation, the emergence 
of China, trade wars and the risk of the collapse of the multilateral 
system indicate that the past is not necessarily going to be a good 
predictor of the future. Your challenge will be to navigate those 
waters, partly in the dark, to achieve and maintain price stability 
and contribute to financial stability. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS
Our main recommendation is to start your term by reviewing 
the monetary policy framework. The Bank of Canada decided to 
review its monetary policy framework in late 2018, ahead of the 
2021 renewal of the inflation control agreement4. The US Federal 
Reserve Board at around the same time reached a similar conclu-
sion5. As the ECB faces significant challenges that call for more 
than just small changes, it should also thoroughly review its own 
framework and toolbox. Your appointment as president and the 
renewal of two thirds of the governing council between 2018 and 
2019 present a good opportunity to reflect on whether the current 
framework is well suited for the uncertainties of the future.
High uncertainty, in terms of both the environment in which 
the ECB will have to operate and the effectiveness of the available 
tools, requires that monetary policy design pay attention to both 
robustness and flexibility. 
Robustness implies that policy design cannot be based solely on 
what is best in the baseline scenario. The ECB will rather have to 
design policies that can deliver as good a performance as possi-
ble across a range of possible scenarios. In other words, the ECB 
should not rank its policy alternatives in terms of what performs 
*MONETARY 
POLICY 
FRAMEWORK
GRÉGORY CLAEYS, MARIA DEMERTZIS AND FRANCESCO PAPADIA11 | 
best for the most likely circumstances, but should rather rank 
them in terms of whether they do well enough for the most varied 
circumstances (Ben-Haim and Demertzis, 2016).
At the same time, the ECB must use flexibility to adapt its 
operations as it increases its knowledge about the new economic 
environment and the effectiveness of its tools. But this must be 
combined with sufficient consideration for continuity, in order to 
make monetary policy as transparent and as predictable as possi-
ble, in order to manage expectations effectively. Last, communica-
tion will also have to reflect the lack of knowledge that uncertainty 
implies. More than about monetary policy intentions, communi-
cation should be about how monetary policy is able to deal with 
the possibility of adverse outcomes. 
What next for monetary policy?
If inflation convincingly moves towards its close to 2 percent 
target, the ECB should communicate the modalities of a return 
to positive interest rates, and start to plan for its optimal balance 
sheet size in the long run and its preferred operational framework.
If, on the contrary, there is no progress towards the inflation target 
and, even more, if the euro area faces a new downturn, the ECB 
should be ready to apply a range of tools. Our main recommenda-
tions in this case are that:
• The ECB should maintain generous refinancing operations 
and balance-sheet management in its monetary policy 
toolbox.
• In order to restart its asset purchase programme, if neces-
sary, the ECB should be ready to update its self-imposed 
constraints (ie the 33 percent issuer limit and/or the cap-
ital key distribution) and/or include other asset classes in 
its purchases, such as bank loans and possibly equities. 
One could consider whether the 33 percent limit achieves 
the right balance between the risk of monetary financing 
and the risk of not meeting the price-stability objective. 
For instance, the risk of monetary financing of an AAA-
rated government appears currently to be negligible and 
should not act as a constraint on the implementation of the 
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asset purchase programme and the fulfilment of the ECB’s 
mandate. In order to facilitate the implementation of its QE 
programme, should it need to use it again, the ECB should 
thus relax the limit, at least for highly-rated countries6. 
• Last, the ECB should also start to evaluate potential new 
tools in case it proves insufficient to regain and maintain 
price stability. Direct injections of cash into the economy 
by the central bank (ie helicopter money) or interventions 
in other markets (eg the market for inflation derivatives; 
see Papadia, 2015) should not be discarded without care-
ful evaluation. Given the limited space the ECB has, new 
tools should be studied so that, if ever needed, they can 
be applied with adequate knowledge of what they might 
achieve and at what risk. 
More broadly, when reviewing its framework, the ECB should 
consider two issues:
• First, the ECB should reinforce the message that the 2 
percent inflation objective is the best quantification of the 
Treaty mandate of price stability. Providing some clarity 
through precision is crucial. This is particularly relevant 
given the other uncertainties we have described. If a statis-
tically measured 2 percent inflation means that, in reality, 
prices do not change, then any rate lower than that means 
prices are reducing. On the other hand, raising the target 
above 2 percent, even if it increases the policy space, would 
imply that the ECB would no longer aim at price stability, 
as required by the Treaty, not to mention that in the current 
circumstances a higher target seems very difficult to attain. 
In order to reap the benefits of an effective focal point, in 
other words an explicit, clear and well-understood numer-
ical inflation target, the ECB should consider introducing 
explicitly defined tolerance bands around a precise numer-
ical target, which has been shown to reinforce credibility via 
accountability (Demertzis and Viegi, 2008, 2010).
• Second, the ECB could also consider modifying other 
elements of its price-stability definition: it could put more 
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emphasis on core inflation and consider targeting inflation 
on average over, say, the business cycle instead of ‘over the 
medium term’. This could help prevent rushed policy rever-
sals and could have helped to avoid the erroneous interest 
rate increases of 2011 (Claeys et al, 2018). 
• Last, you will have to manage decision making in the 
governing council. In doing this you should try as much as 
possible to foster convergence in the governing council, free 
from national considerations. However, you should not try 
to reach unanimity or consensus at all costs, as this could 
lead to timid or late decisions that could damage the euro-
area economy. 
The ECB’s crucial role in the euro-area architecture
An important role that the ECB has had to play and might have 
to play again is to provide policy certainty when other forms of 
uncertainty prevail. The “whatever it takes” speech of President 
Draghi provided this clarity when the level of uncertainty threat-
ened the euro’s existence. While the announcement of OMT 
convinced the markets that the ECB had both the tools and the 
willingness to intervene, the ECB needs to re-examine the frame-
work behind this programme and ensure that it serves its purpose 
of reducing uncertainty as much as possible. 
Our main recommendations here are that:
• The new ECB leadership should reconfirm that it is ready 
to use OMT to avoid liquidity crises in the sovereign debt 
markets of euro-area members.
*EURO-AREA 
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• Important steps have been taken to ensure the soundness 
of the OMT’s architecture: the involvement of a European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) programme as a precondition 
necessary to avoid moral hazard requires a neutral assess-
ment by the European Commission of the sustainability of 
the fiscal position, and the political commitment to back 
it up provided by the ESM board, ie the euro-area finance 
ministers. In further considering the role of the ESM, 
the ECB should clarify the unnecessary ambiguity in its 
original OMT press release (ECB, 2012) and state that an 
ESM Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line, which is the 
natural candidate to be used in liquidity crises, should be 
considered sufficient as a pre-condition to access an OMT 
programme (Claeys and Mathieu Collin, 2018). 
• Another important element to reduce the fragility of 
sovereign debt in the euro area would be for the ECB to 
re-examine its collateral framework to make sure it does 
not participate in compromising the safe-asset status of 
the sovereign bonds of euro-area members (Claeys and 
Goncalves Raposo, 2018) and also increase its transparency 
when it comes to these potentially controversial and crucial 
decisions.
The ECB’s role in promoting financial stability
Low interest rates for a long time might contribute to the 
build-up of financial imbalances7 that might be difficult to 
identify in real time but proliferate in very unpredictable ways. 
As we have noted, there is a risk that policy and market rates in 
the euro area will remain low for a very long time. This implies 
that financial instability will remain a significant threat to the 
system, even if we cannot precisely predict in what form. It is 
doubtful that, with the current institutional framework and 
given the uncertainty about their effectiveness, macro-pruden-
tial measures can provide effective protection against financial 
instability. While we do not believe that monetary policy should 
directly target financial stability at the detriment of price stabil-
ity (Agur and Demertzis 2019), the ECB does have a role to play 
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in the pursuit of financial stability. We recommend that:
• The ECB should contribute to deeper analytical founda-
tions for macro-prudential policies as a first line of defence 
against the build-up of financial stability risks; cooperation 
with the European Systemic Risk Board should be enhanced 
on this issue.
• The ECB should make proposals for the establishment of a 
better institutional set-up for the use of macro-prudential 
tools, so that it can act in a timely and effective way.
• The ECB should monitor carefully financial stability risk in 
the euro area, and alert the relevant institutions responsible 
for implementing macro-prudential policies when it identi-
fies signs of build-up of financial imbalances.
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ENDNOTES
1 We focus in this memo on your responsibility for monetary policy, not on your super-
visory role.
2 This dilemma becomes even more acute if one also considers that the ECB, through 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism, is the supervisor of systematically relevant banks 
in the euro system. 
3 And there is even a view that the neutral rate is not even relevant for policy (Borio et 
al, 2017).
4 https://www.bankofcanada.ca/2018/11/bank-review-monetary-policy-frame-
work-ahead-2021/.
5 https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-of-monetary-policy-strate-
gy-tools-and-communications.htm.
6 The Court of Justice of the European Union in 2018 seemed to imply that the relevant 
limit of the public sector purchase programme is not to buy all the bonds issued, 
as it states that the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) is “not permitted to 
buy either all the bonds issued by such an issuer or the entirety of a given issue of those 
bonds” and that monetary financing is avoided when “a private operator necessarily 
runs the risk of not being able to resell them to the ESCB on the secondary markets, as 
a purchase of all the bonds issued is in all cases precluded”. See the judgement in case 
C-493/17, 11 December 2018, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=208741&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=req&dir=&oc-
c=first&part=1&cid=6032640.
7 Zero interest rate means that asset prices become very volatile as any change in 
future returns of these assets, even if 20 years ahead, is not discounted. So, volatility 
necessarily increases for rates equal to zero.
GRÉGORY CLAEYS, MARIA DEMERTZIS AND FRANCESCO PAPADIA17 | 
REFERENCES
Agur, I. and M. Demertzis (2019) ‘Will Macroprudential policy Counteract the 
Monetary Policy Effects on Bank Behavior?’ North American Journal of Economics 
and Finance Volume 48, 2019: 65-75
Ben-Haim, Y. and M. Demertzis (2016) ‘Decision Making in Times of 
Knightian Uncertainty: An Info-Gap Perspective’, The Open-Access, Open 
Assessment e-journal, 23 
Beyer, R.C.M. and V. Wieland (2019) ‘Instability, imprecision and inconsistent 
use of equilibrium real interest rate estimates’, Journal of International Money and 
Finance, Volume 94, June: 1-14
Bonam, D., J. de Haan and D. van Limbergen (2018) ‘Time-varying wage 
Phillips curves in the euro area with a new measure for labor market slack’, DNB 
Working Paper No. 587, De Nederlandsche Bank
Borio, C., P. Disyatat, M. Juselius and P. Rungcharoenkitkul (2017) ‘Why so low 
for so long? A long-term view of real interest rates’, BIS Working Papers No. 685, 
Bank for International Settlements
Claeys, G. and A. Mathieu Collin (2018) ‘Does the Eurogroup’s 
reform of the ESM toolkit represent real progress?’ Bruegel 
Blog, 13 December, available at: http://bruegel.org/2018/12/
does-the-eurogroups-reform-of-the-esm-toolkit-represent-real-progress/
Claeys, G. and M. Demertzis (2017) ‘How should the ECB “normalise” its 
monetary policy?’ Policy Contribution 2017/31, Bruegel
Claeys, G., M. Demertzis and J. Mazza (2018) ‘A monetary policy framework 
for the European Central Bank to deal with uncertainty’, Policy Contribution 
2018/21, Bruegel
Claeys, G. and I. Goncalves Raposo (2018) ‘Is the ECB collateral framework 
compromising the safe-asset status of euro-area sovereign bonds?’ Bruegel Blog, 
8 June, available at: http://bruegel.org/2018/06/is-the-ecb-collateral-frame-
work-compromising-the-safe-asset-status-of-euro-area-sovereign-bonds/
Claeys, G. and T. Linta (2019) ‘Decision making in the ECB Governing 
Council since 1999’, Bruegel Blog, http://bruegel.org/2019/06/
the-evolution-of-the-ecb-governing-councils-decision-making/
Darvas, Z. (2019) ‘Forecast errors and monetary policy normalisation in the 
euro area’, Policy Contribution 2019/24, Bruegel
Dell’Ariccia, G., L. Laeven and G. Suarez (2017) ‘Bank leverage and monetary 
policy’s risk-taking channel: Evidence from the United States’, Journal of Finance 
72(2): 613-654 
Demertzis, M. and N. Viegi (2008) ‘Inflation Targets as Focal Points’, 
International Journal of Central Banking 4(1): 55-87 
Demertzis, M. Viegi, N (2010), ‘Inflation Targeting: a Framework for 
Communication’, B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics (Topics), Vol. 9, 1.
MEMO TO THE NEW EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK PRESIDENT18 | 
ECB (2012) ‘Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions’, 6 
September, European Central Bank, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html
Holston, K., T. Laubach and J.C. Williams (2017) ‘Measuring the natural 
rate of interest: International trends and determinants’, Journal of International 
Economics 108(1): 59-75
Papadia F. (2015) ‘A help for the ECB from the derivative market’, blog 
post, 23 February, available at: http://moneymatters-monetarypolicy.
eu/a-help-for-the-ecb-from-the-derivative-market/
Papadia, F. and T. Välimäki (2018) Central Banking in Turbulent Times, Oxford 
University Press
